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ABSTRACT: Terrorist attacks can have a multitude of economic consequences that 
may adversely affect a number of economic sectors and activities including capital 
markets. This paper examines the impact of three major terrorist incidents on the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange, one of the major emerging markets internationally. The 
reaction of both the general index as well as sectorial indices is investigated. The 
findings reported herein indicate that the impact, although significant in certain 
cases, had only short-lived effects since the market rebound was fairly quick. Of the 
sectorial indices, the tourist industry is found to be more adversely affected by these 
events.  
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ÖZET: Terörist saldırıların sermaye piyasalarını da kapsayan birçok sektör ve 
faaliyet üzerinde olumsuz etki yaratabilecek çeşitli ekonomik yansıması 
olabilmektedir. Bu makale, üç ana terörist saldırının önemli yükselen uluslararası 
borsalardan biri olan İstanbul Borsası üzerindeki etkilerini incelemektedir. Hem 
genel endeksin hem de sektörel endekslerin verdiği tepkiler araştırılmaktadır. 
Burada sunulan sonuçlara göre bazı durumlarda anlamlı tepkiler verilmiş olsa da 
bu tepkiler kısa süreli olmuş ve endeks çabuk toparlanmıştır. Sektörel endekslerden 
en olumsuz etkilenen turizm sektörü olmuştur. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler:  Vaka Çalışması; Terörizm; Volatilite, İstanbul Borsası 
 
1. Introduction 
With the predominance over the past decade or so of terrorism as the main 
international security threat, the number of papers that take up the issue of the 
economic effects of terrorist actions, has steadily grown (inter alia: Enders and 
Sandler, 2006; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008; Sandler, 2003). A part of this 
growing body of literature has focused its attention to the possible effects terrorist 
attacks can have on stock markets both in terms of returns as well as volatility (inter 
alia: Barros and Gil-Alana, 2009; Chesney et al., 2011; Kollias et al. 2011a, 2013; 
Nikkinen et al, 2008; Fernandez, 2008). As a plethora of studies have shown, 
markets and market agents react to unexpected events such as, for example, natural 
catastrophes, anthropogenic disasters, political instability, conflict and war (inter 
alia: Kaplanski and Levy, 2010; Kollias et al. 2010; Bolak and Suer, 2008; Herbst et 
al. 1996). Major terrorist attacks are unforeseen events that act as external shocks. 
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Thus, they have the potential to affect market risk premium, highly increasing 
volatility and exert an adverse impact on asset valuation, investment decisions and 
portfolio allocation (inter alia: Drakos, 2004, 2010; Chen and Siems, 2004; Kollias 
et al. 2013).  
 
For instance, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) find that through increased 
uncertainty, terrorism reduces the expected return to investment and thus changes in 
the intensity of terrorist incidents may cause significant movements of capital across 
countries. Using event study methodology, Chen and Siems (2004) examine the 
magnitude of the effects the 9/11 New York terrorist attacks had on global and US 
capital markets. They report an overall significant impact but a relatively speedy 
recovery for US markets compared to other global capital markets. Nikkinen et al, 
(2008) also examine the effects 9/11 had on 53 markets across the world. Their 
results indicate increased volatility as well as short-run negative effects that vary 
across regions depending on the degree of their integration into the global economy. 
From a different angle, Hon et al. (2004) focus on how the cross-country correlation 
of assets was affected from the same terrorist mega-event (i.e. 9/11). Compared to 
the time before 9/11, their results, especially for European markets, indicate that 
international stock markets responded more closely to US stock market shocks in the 
three to six months that followed 9/11. The 9/11 effects on markets are also 
addressed by Drakos (2004) who focuses on the shares of the airline industry. His 
findings indicate that the stock market valuation of such shares was adversely and 
significantly affected due to changed risk perceptions by consumers that led to lower 
demand for air travel and higher insurance premia due to the reassessment by 
insurance companies of the risks. Two other major terrorist attacks, the March 2004 
Madrid and July 2005 London bombings, and the reaction of the Spanish and 
London markets respectively, is the theme of Kollias et al. (2011a). Eldor and 
Melnick (2004) examine the impact of terror on Israel’s foreign exchange market 
and the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) given the frequent and continuous 
terrorist incidents Israel faces. Their findings indicate that the foreign exchange 
market was affected but the opposite was the case for TASE. Two European Union 
stock markets – the London and Athens stock exchanges and their comparative 
reaction to terrorist incidents depending on their attributes is the theme of Kollias et 
al. (2011b). Other studies, such as that of Barros and Gil-Alana (2008), instead of 
focusing on the consequences of a single major terrorist incident, look at how 
ongoing terrorist activity has affected financial markets while Kollias et al. (2013) 
examine how the stock-bond correlation is affected by terrorist activity, reporting 
findings that suggest a flight-to-safety effect. 
 
In line with such previous studies and hoping to contribute to this particular body of 
literature, this paper sets out to examine the impact major terrorist attacks had on the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange (henceforth ISE). To this effect, an event study 
methodology to assess ISE’s reaction is used. The impact of these events on 
conditional volatility is also addressed. We begin by briefly presenting in the next 
section the main issues associated with terrorist activity in Turkey. Then, in section 
three the methodology employed is presented and the empirical findings analyzed 
and discussed. Finally, section four concludes the paper.     
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2. Terrorist Activity in Turkey: An Overview 
Turkey is by no means a stranger to terrorism. Especially since the mid 1980’s she 
has experienced an almost steady increase in terrorist activity   (Rodoplu, 2003; Aras 
and Toktaş, 2007; Feridun and Sezgin, 2008; Yaya, 2009; Feridun, 2011). Several 
terrorist groups operate or have in the past operated in Turkey. The vast majority are 
domestic terrorist organisations but some of them apparently have strong 
international connections or loose ties with infamous transnational terrorist 
organisations such as Al-Qaeda. The most prominent among the groups that operate 
in Turkey is PKK, a left-wing guerrilla army established in 1978 with a nationalist 
separatist agenda. Other terrorist organisations include both left wing revolutionary 
groups such as the leftist group Dev-Sol of the 1970s, DHKP/C and TIKKO; as well 
as Islamic fundamentalist groups such as the Turkish Islamic Jihad and IBDA/C 
with close ties to Al-Qaeda that reportedly also has shells operating in Turkey.  
 
As Yaya (2009) observes, a distinct characteristic of terrorist activity in Turkey is 
that it has not concentrated only on attacks in metropolitan areas. It has hit targets 
across the whole country both in cities as well as rural areas. Not surprisingly, a 
number of studies have addressed the issues associated with terrorist activity in 
Turkey, trying to assess its economic effects. A number of them concentrated on the 
effects terrorism has on the tourist industry since it is an important income generator 
for the Turkish economy (Feridun, 2011; Ozsoy and Sahin, 2006; Yaya, 2009; Araz-
Takay et al., 2010).  
 
This paper departs from previous studies on the economic effects of terrorism in the 
case of Turkey. It does not concentrate on the aggregate level of the economy or a 
specific sector, such as tourism. It turns its attention to the reaction of ISE to major 
terrorist incidents that took place in 1999, 2003 and 2008. All three are selected 
because they are generally considered to be the most severe and serious attacks that 
have taken place in a major metropolitan area, given that Istanbul - the venue of the 
three events - is the financial centre of Turkey. The attacks were also particularly 
violent in terms of fatalities and were aimed at civilian targets (Table 1). Noteworthy 
are the 2003 bombings that targeted important, in terms of symbolism, targets: the 
British Consulate in Istanbul, Jewish synagogues and HSBC’s headquarters. They 
were also the severest of the three attacks in terms of the sheer number of victims.  
 
Table 1. Summary of the Terrorist Events in Istanbul 
 Target Fatalities Injuries 
13 March 1999 Shopping mall 13 23 
15 November 2003 Jewish synagogues 27 >300 
20 November 2003 British Consulate & HSBC bank headquarters 30 >400 
27 July 2008 Shopping street 17 >150 
 
The terrorist attack of 13th March 1999 took place in the Mavi Çarşı shopping mall 
in the Göztepe suburb in the Asian side of Istanbul. The shopping mall was taken 
over and set ablaze by the terrorists leaving thirteen people dead and twenty-three 
injured (Rodoplu et al. 2003). Although there was no official claim of responsibility 
by any organization or group, the attack was associated with PKK. The 2003 
terrorist events took place with a five-day interval between them. The first, on 
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November 15, targeted the Jewish synagogues Bet Israel, in Şişli, and Neve Shalom, 
in the Galata district. They were attacked with bomb carrying cars that crashed into 
the synagogues. Five days later, on November 20, the British Consulate in Istanbul 
and HSBC’s headquarters were the targets of two trucks loaded with explosives. 
Both attacks cost the lives of around sixty people and left more than seven hundred 
injured. A radical Turkish Islamic group, apparently with strong ties with Al-Qaeda, 
the Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' Front (İBDA/C), claimed responsibility. This 
probably explains not only the severity of the attack but the strong symbolism 
embedded in the choice of the targets. Finally, the 2008 bombings of July 27 had as 
a target a shopping street in the Güngören neighborhood of Istanbul. The bomb 
explosions claimed the lives of seventeen people (five of them children) and injured 
more than one hundred and fifty. Again, no responsibility was claimed. However, 
security forces attributed the bombing to PKK. In the next section we turn to 
examine ISE’s reaction to these three major terrorist events.     
 
3. The Impact on the Istanbul Stock Exchange 
The Istanbul Stock Exchange is a major emerging stock market. It has a market 
capitalization of more than $120bn and more than 300 listed companies. For the 
purposes of the analysis that follows, daily prices of the ISE are used. Six major 
indices are selected as the most representative sample through which the market’s 
reaction to the aforementioned terrorist events can be investigated: the National-100, 
the Bank Index, the Industrial Index, the Services Index, the Tourism Index and the 
Trade Index. All of them are drawn from the Reuters DataStream database. The 
sample covers the period from January 1997 to December 2009 and includes 3391 
trading days (Figures 1a, 1b, 1c)1. The dates of interest for the purposes of the paper 
are 15/03/1999, 20/11/2003 and 27/07/2008 when the attacks mentioned above took 
place2. Event studies as well as volatility analysis are the instruments widely used to 
assess and quantify markets’ reaction to specific incidents and events (inter alia: 
Chen and Siems, 2004; Kollias et al. 2011a, 2011b).  
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Figure 1a: Price Indices 15/03/1999 
                                                 
1 The sample period is selected based on data availability.  
2 Given that 13/3/1999 was a Saturday in the tests that follow 15/3/1999 is taken as the event day to 
investigate the market’s reaction. Similarly, the 15/11/2003 was also a Saturday and given that it was 
immediately followed by a second major hit on 20/11/2003 it was decided to use the 20/11/2003 as the 
event day for the relevant tests.  
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Figure 1b: Price Indices 20/11/2003 
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Figure 1c: Price Indices 27/07/2008 
 
Event Study Methodology 
In line with Craig-MacKinley (1997), an event study is employed in sequential 
steps. Firstly, the event window is selected, i.e. the number of days before and after 
the event day. Secondly, for a specific period of time an asset pricing model is 
estimated describing the evolution of equity returns. Then, based on the difference 
between actual and estimated returns abnormal returns are calculated. More 
specifically, by adopting an asset pricing model the expected returns of an equity 
can be modelled conditional on a number of factors (e.g. factors concerning global 
financial environment, currency risk etc) 1 2( | , ,..., )nE R X X X . 
 
In order to assess the impact of these incidents on the market indices that were 
selected, i.e. ISE’s general index, as well as the five sectoral indices, an asset pricing 
model is estimated. Thus the general formula of the arbitrage pricing model for 
expected index return in our case is as follows: 
 
 0 1 2 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( )   M USt t t tE R b b E R b E R b E FX    (1) 
 
Where the daily return of the national 100 index is used as a proxy for the local 
market ( MtR ); the daily return of the Dow Jones index (
US
tR ) is used for capturing 
the effect from world financial interactions, and, in order to allow for the presence of 
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exchange rate risk, the daily rate of the US dollar versus the Turkish Lira ( tFX ) is 
added in order to reflect the covariance of the asset with the US dollar exchange 
rate.  Rational expectations are assumed in order to estimate (1). Hence, from the 
expected return we can get actual returns. Solving the following two equations and 
then substituting in (1) we get (2) that can be estimated empirically. 
 
1( ) ( ) t tE R R e , 2( ) ( ) M Mt tE R R e , 3( ) ( ) US USt tE R R e  
4( ) ( ) t tE FX FX e 0 1 2 3    M USt t t t tR b b R b R b FX e  
(2) 
 
Then, the parameters of the regression equation (1)3 are calculated, using 3191 
trading days from February 1997 to December 2009 and thus we obtain the 
estimated returns.  
 
0 1 2 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ M US
t t t tR b b R b R b FX     
 
Then, daily excess or abnormal returns are calculated through the difference of the 
actual return and the estimated return: 
 
 ˆ( )t t tA R R R   (3)  
 
Initially, the event-day abnormal returns are calculated. The date of the event is set 
at t=0, and two longer event windows are examined by computing the cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CARs) 3 (t=3) and 6 days following the event (t=6). The 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) were estimated using the following equation: 
 
 
2
1
T
t t
t T
CAR AR

   (4) 
 
where T1 is the event day and T2 is consequently 3 and 6 days after the event. 
 
The findings of the event study methodology for each one of the three key dates are 
presented in Table 2 where the abnormal returns and statistical significance levels 
for the 0, 3, and 6-day event windows are shown. Furthermore, a column was 
included that shows the number of trading days that elapsed before each of the 
indices returned to the initial pre-attack level. The results indicate that the 1999 
attack had, broadly speaking, a negative effect on the event day on both the general 
as well as the sectoral indices. The only exception to this general reaction was the 
Trade index (Table 2). Worth noticing is that the largest negative and statistically 
significant abnormal return is recorded in the case of the Tourism Industry (-8.86%) 
followed by that of the Industrial Index (-2.69%). The Tourism Index also displays 
significant negative 3 and 11-day cumulative abnormal returns. This finding accords 
with that of other studies. It shows that this sector is particularly sensitive and 
vulnerable to terrorist attacks irrespective of whether the culprits are domestic or 
transnational terrorist organizations.  This is true not only in the case of Turkey but 
elsewhere given its importance as an income generator for a number of countries 
                                                 
3 When the National-100 index is considered as dependent variable the model includes only the Dow 
Jones index and the currency risk factor. 
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(inter alia: Feridun, 2011; Enders et al. 1992; Drakos and Kutan, 2003; Yaya, 2009). 
As among others these studies have shown, persistent terrorist activity or headlines 
capturing terrorist events, as the ones examined here, impact destination choices by 
international tourists, since they raise country risk perceptions. As, among others, 
the findings reported by Sönmez and Graefe (1998), Sönmez (1998) and Llorca-
Vivero (2008) indicate, terrorist activity constitutes negative advertising for the 
country that may cause tourists or indeed other type of visitors such as business 
persons to reconsider their decision to visit. This of course is particularly true when 
the target is tourist venues or transportation networks. Since Istanbul is one of the 
prime tourist destinations for visitors in Turkey, the negative impact on the tourist 
industry is augmented. A reduction in tourist arrivals affects foreign exchange 
earnings and tourist revenues for the plethora of economic activities associated with 
this industry. In this context, the negative response of this index reflects a fall in 
investors’ expectations for the tourist industry’s turn-over and hence profitability. In 
contrast to the tourist industry index, all the other indices exhibit a quick recovery 
within two days or so and positive CARs. This transitory and broadly insignificant 
effect accords with the findings reported by previous studies (inter alia: Chen and 
Siems, 2004; Drakos, 2010; Kollias et al. 2011b, 2013). A tentative explanation is 
that there was ample time for the impact of the attack to be absorbed and discounted 
by the time markets opened given that the incident took place on a Sunday. But it 
may also be indicating that markets are fairly efficient when it comes to absorbing 
and incorporating events. As a result, they quickly rebound, following the initial 
exogenous shock that rattles them. In fact, as noted above, this is a common finding 
and conclusion among a number of studies (inter alia: Eldor and Melnick, 2004; 
Chen and Siems, 2004; Kollias et al. 2011a, 2013).  
 
Quite the opposite is observed in the case of the next attack examined here. The 15th 
and 20th November 2003 bombings appear to have rattled ISE (Table 2). The 
significance (symbolic or otherwise) of the targets – Jewish Synagogues, the British 
Consulate, HSBC’s headquarters - may explain this reaction. Indeed, as the results 
of other studies suggest, markets’ reaction to terrorist events can significantly vary 
with the magnitude of the response depending on a number of factors that include 
the severity of the attack in terms of victims and damages and the significance of the 
target(s) hit (Kollias et al. 2011b). Clearly the targets chosen by the terrorist on this 
occasion were of high symbolism both in terms of a diplomatic and international 
relations perspective as well as in terms of economic significance. To this, one must 
also add the sheer number of victims in terms of fatalities and injuries. In other 
words, the attacks in question had all the attributes that trigger and cause a major 
reaction by markets. Generally, the findings of the event study suggest that the 
attacks left an identifiable imprint on ISE. On the event day the actual reaction of the 
main index was a fall of -7.59%. In fact, as a result of these attacks, the havoc that 
they created and perhaps most importantly the significance of the targets hit, trading 
was suspended. The stock exchange was closed and reopened4 on December 1st with 
Turkey’s Central Bank prepared to intervene to support the falling of Turkish Lira. 
With no exception, all the indices record a fall with the two largest reactions being 
those of the Bank and Tourism Indices that fall by almost 11% and display negative 
and statistically significant ARs. Just as in the case of the first attack, the Tourism 
Index continued to record losses and rebounded only after fifteen trading days have 
elapsed. With this exception, the days ISE remained closed appear to have proved 
                                                 
4 Cumulative abnormal returns are estimated since the opening of the stock exchange on December 1st. 
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enough for the market to recover in a single trading day once trading resumed. 
Hence, it is possible to argue that the decision of the supervisory authorities to 
suspend trading was vindicated since it helped the market and market agents to 
absorb the repercussions of the episode avoiding an unjustified overreaction to the 
initial shock waves. In a sense it contributed to curtailing and abating the negative 
spill-overs of the attacks. Overall, in view of these findings, one may tentatively 
point to implications for portfolio management strategies. In particular, given that all 
ISE sectors do not exhibit a similar reaction to violent and unexpected events, such 
as the terrorist attacks examined here, diversification benefits may exist for investors 
and portfolio managers. Since the tourist and to a lesser extent the banking sectors 
seem to exhibit a greater sensitivity and vulnerability to such events, portfolios that 
are mainly based on these two sectors would probably be better off with greater 
diversification in order to hedge against such eventualities.    
 
Table 2. Abnormal Returns of indices 15/3/99, 20/11/03, 27/7/08 
 15/3/1999 20/11/2003 27/7/2008 
Index Event  day AR 
3-day 
CAR 
6-day 
CAR 
Event 
day AR 
3-day 
CAR 
6-day 
CAR 
Event 
day AR
3-day 
CAR 
6-day 
CAR 
Nat-100 -2,30% 0,22% 4,35% -7,59% -1,93% -4,47% 1,99% 11,07% 10.19% 
t-stat (-0,74) (0,07) (1,40) (-2,89)* (-0,73) (-1,70) (0,89) (4,98)* (4,59)* 
Days to Rebound 2   1   0   
Bank Index -1,88% -0,03% -0,47% -10,22% 4,53% 8,12% 4,19% 20,84% 18,53% 
t-stat (-0,43) (-0,008) (-0,49) (-2,68)* (1,19) (2,13) (1,12) (5,57)* (4,95)* 
Days to Rebound 3   1   0   
Industrial Index -2,69% 0,97% 6,93% -6,07% 2,15% 4,86% 0,43% 6,68% 7,56% 
t-stat (-1,15) (0,41) (2,96)* (-2,94)* (1,04) (2,36)* (0,24) (3,71)* (4,20)* 
Days to Rebound 2   1   0   
Services Index -0,93% -0,84% 2,49% -6,06% 0,10% -0,31% 0,54% 6,20% 4,22% 
t-stat (-0,37) (-0,34) (1,00) (-3,09)* (0,05) (-0,16) (0,32) (3,66)* (2,49)* 
Days to Rebound 3   1   0   
Tourism Index -8,86% -16,84% -14,63% -10,84% -11,15% -6,36% -0,44% 4,85% 14,31% 
t-stat (-2,38)* (-4,53)* (-3,94)* (-4,37)* (-4,52)* (-2,58)* (-0,02) (2,49)* (6,97)* 
Days to Rebound >100   15   1   
Trade Index 0,07% -0,27% 3,02% -6,91% -1,95% -1,50% -0,11% 1,58% 4,66% 
t-stat (0,02) (-0,09) (1,06) (-3,72)* (-1,05) (-0,81) (-0,06) (0,93) (2,74)* 
Days to Rebound 0   3   1   
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses. ªNumber of trading days for the market index to return to pre-attack 
level. *Statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
 
Finally, in the case of the last of the three terrorist incidents examined here, the July 
2008 attack, our results do not reveal a significant negative reaction by ISE. As it 
can be seen in Table 2, positive and statistically significant CARs appear to be the 
case for most of the indices. A tentative explanation that could be proposed is that 
this bombing was treated - in relative terms - as a minor and insignificant incident 
by the market and investors compared to the devastating 2003 attacks. In other 
words, this attack did not have any attributes that would warrant a noteworthy 
reaction by market agents. Hence trading continued unabated. Although it claimed 
the lives of seventeen people (five of them children) the significance and location of 
the venue were not comparable to those of 15th and 20th November 2003 bombings. 
This in itself would explain why no effect is statistically traceable in our dataset. 
Nevertheless, data of a higher frequency – i.e. intraday data – may reveal a slightly 
different picture in terms of short-term intraday reaction which apparently did not 
last. Furthermore, one may also add that the absence of any statistically traceable 
response could also reflect a growing resilience and stoutness of markets and 
investors to such incidents. In other words, increased market efficiency when it 
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comes to the reaction that markets and market agents exhibit to unanticipated 
external shocks such as terrorist episodes.  
 
Time- varying Volatility 
The next step in our analysis is to examine the effect of the three terrorist attacks on 
volatility. The Gauss-Markov assumption for linear regressions is usually violated 
because of the time dependency of the error in high frequency daily stock market 
and renders the estimation of ordinary least squares (OLS) models inefficient. Based 
on the relevant literature (Engle, 1983; Engle and Ng, 1993; Bollerslev, 1986), a 
GARCH modeling technique is more appropriate to solve this problem. The 
conditional variance of the sectoral indices is tested for insecurity effect by 
estimating the following equations: 
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where tR  is the daily return for the index , ,i td  is a dummy variable which takes the 
value of 1 for the event day (i), and t  is the error term with conditional mean zero 
and conditional variance th . Where there has been evidence of autocorrelation, an 
AR(1) model is estimated for the residuals (the relevant coefficient in Table 3 is c4). 
Volatility is modeled using a simple GARCH(1,1) model5. Since the innovations 
appear leptokurtic rather than normally distributed, quasi–maximum likelihood 
(QML) covariances and robust standard errors have been used (Bollerslev and 
Wooldridge, 1992). 
 
From the results reported in Table 3, the Bank sector emerges as the most sensitive. 
It reacts more to the bad news of the terrorist attack as this is implied by the high 
value of α in the volatility equation. Generally, all the sectors present significant 
volatility persistence as it can be deduced from the high values of β. Perhaps 
noteworthy is the significance of the dummies in the conditional volatility equation 
in the case of the 2003 bombings. A significant negative effect in the volatility 
across sectors is unearthed by our estimations suggesting herding behavior. At a first 
glance, this may be regarded as a strongly counterintuitive finding. However, this 
finding possibly reflects the effect that the suspension of trading for around a week 
had on the volatility of the market. As noted above, the significance of the targets as 
well as the severity of the attacks in terms of victims were such that trading was 
suspended. The stock exchange closed for about a week until December 1st when it 
was reopened and trading was allowed to be resumed. This probably explains the 
counterintuitive finding of our estimations. The days that elapsed until the reopening 
of the market offered ample time for the immediate shock to be absorbed and the 
financial turmoil to pass away.   
 
                                                 
5 For the estimation of GARCH models the E-views software was used. 
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Table 3. Estimates of the Conditional Mean and Variance Equations  
for indices’ returns 
  The conditional mean equation The conditional variance equation 
Indices C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 ω α β γ1 γ2 γ3 
Nat-100 0,001192* 0,303867* 0,000227 - - 0,000011* 0,093534* 0,893169* 0,000338 0,000573 0,00011 
Bank -0,000383 0,084777* -0,080567* 1,312021* - 0,000006* 0,240162* 0,768925* -0,000105 -0,0000065 0,000157 
Industrial 0,000104 -0,02078* 0,011623 0,819313* 0,05988* 0,000003* 0,101278* 0,842771* -0,000027 -0,000025* 0,000145 
Services 0,000095 -0,037943 0,006877 0,80464* - 0,000007* 0,145368* 0,81061* 0,000095* -0,000095* -0,000041 
Tourism -0,000395 0,053786 0,041487 0,852745* 0,04831* 0,000017* 0,074151* 0,902099* 0,000827 0,0000468 0,000177 
Trade 0,000273 -0,031075 -0,046567 0,728723* 0,006623 0,000003* 0,069647* 0,917219* 0,00021 -0,000142* 0,000146 
*Statistically Significant at the 0.05 level. 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
A number of studies have addressed the issue of the economic effects of terrorist 
activity in Turkey. This paper set out to examine the impact that three major terrorist 
events had on ISE. Terrorist incidents are unforeseen, even in countries that are or 
have been the victims of systematic terror campaigns, such as Turkey in our case. 
From the markets’ perspective terrorist attacks represent exogenous shocks that 
rattle and upset the daily social and economic routine and on occasions can also 
have serious political repercussions on the domestic as well as international level. In 
order to examine the impact on ISE, event study methodology and market volatility 
analysis were used. In broad terms, the findings reported herein do not seem to 
indicate any long lasting effects on the market’s operation apart from the initial 
reaction that one would expect to be the case for such major and unforeseen events. 
The significance of the targets as well as the severity of the terrorist attacks seem to 
be the main determinants of the response magnitude. Given the reaction of the 
Tourist Industry index, the sensitivity of this sector to terrorist attacks also emerges 
as a noteworthy finding that accords with the evidence reported by previous studies 
that have examined the effects of terrorist activity on tourism. Nevertheless, the 
overall conclusion is that, although the terrorist attacks examined here had a 
negative impact on ISE, this effect was not particularly pronounced.  
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